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INTRODUCTION
Although the systematic collection of data on job vacancies goes
back to the First World War, the vacancy concept has yet to be
adequately refined, and a comprehensive theory of the labor mar-
ket into which such a concept could be fittedhas yet to be de-
veloped.
Continuing high levels of unemployment over the past seven
years have focused national attention on changes in the labor mar-
ket. Our statistics on the labor market have been examined [50]
to determine what validity can be attributed to the recent trends
in employment and unemployment. The Council of Economic Ad-
visors [17] and economists such as Klein and Ball [29] have made
an effort to determine the reaction of the labor market to changing
levels of aggregate demand. Many careful case and survey studies
supply a factual basis for understanding the functioning of labor
markets [6, 34, 48]. Despite these and other studies, quantitatively
formulated relations in the labor market are still relatively unex-
plored. Phillips [49], Lipsey [36], Eckstein and Wilson [16], and
Bowen and Berry [7] have attempted to link price behavior in
labor markets to other economic indicators.
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and Herbert A. Simon, Social Systems Research Institute of the University of
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A great deal has been learned by these efforts, as well as others
(see references at end of paper), but they have not yet yielded a
comprehensive theory of the labor market. What is sorely needed
are models that would be useful for study of such policy questions
as the relations between aggregate demand, unemployment, and
inflation; the impact of demand in particular submarkets, in spe-
cific regions, or in particular skills; the effect of changing industrial
structure, or the structure of labor demand; the cumulative effect
of unemployment on labor force participation and family incomes;
and finally, the effect of unions on the structure and level of wages.
In this paper we cannot and do not articulate a model in the detail
required to answer all these questions, but we offer an approach
that may be useful in the development of detailed theories of the
labor market. However, we have little at this stage to say about
the effect of unions.
We propose a definition of "job vacancy" that holds promise of
being useful, and then proceed to sketch out a theoretical frame-
work for analyzing the operation of labor markets. Not only are
these our most important markets, but also our most complex ones.
Hence our efforts to produce a simplified abstract formulation must
be viewed as an initial effort requiring further modifications and
refinements.
In the theory presented here, the labor market is viewed as a
complex stochastic process that involves interaction among many
participants. Their actions are governed by fairly complex rela-
tionships arising from the objectives and constraints of firms and
families. Thus, the labor market is not considered in terms of such
relatively simple constructs as supply and demand schedules.
We start by focusing on the two important stocks in the labor
market, unemployed workers and job vacancies. Then we consider
the interaction between these stocks and the corresponding flows,
and determine how the flows and stocks influence each other and
how the market reaches equilibrium.
The hiring of a worker is viewed as resulting from a random
search process through which a nonstandard worker and nonstanci-
ard job are somehow matched to satisfy certain wage and skill
criteria established by firm and worker. As a consequence of thisConcept of Vacancies in Labor Market Theory 75
searchprocess and other occurrences that are treated as random
events, the labor market responds dynamically to a complex stochas-
tic process. Some aspects of the stochastic equilibrium are considered,
especially factors affecting the determination of money wages.
Finally, we consider briefly some of the research and policy impli-
cations of the theory.
THE CONCEPTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND
JOB VACANCIES
In the theory which is developed below, the duration of unemploy-
ment or job vacancy is viewed as significant. The worker who has
been unemployed two months is likely to exhibit substantially dif-
ferent behavior, in terms of search and wage-job preferences, than
he did after having been unemployed for only one week. Similarly,
a company that has been seeking a particular type of worker for
two months is likely to behave quite differently, in terms of its
recruiting, skill requirements, and offering wage, than it did when
it had been recruiting for only a week. Although these changes con-
stitute an important part of the theory, in identifying an unem-
ployed person and job vacancy we need concepts which will not
be overly influenced by the job search or recruiting behavior that
prevails at the time of measurement. Workers who are long un-
employed may hardly be searching at all,' and job vacancies which
have long been unfilled in a tight labor market may hardly show
up in recruitment efforts. Nevertheless, such unemployment and
vacancies are real, important, and should be taken into account
for both theory and policy purposes.
Both the concepts of unemployment and vacancies necessarily
involve a price dimension (everyone would want a job if the wage
offered were high enough and firms would hire all the workers they
could get, if the wage cost were low enough). We need reference
prices that are reasonably close to those available in the current mar-
ket, given existing productivity, etc. Because the skill requirements
1Researchhas clearly shown the importance of the "discouraged worker" and
thecollectionof unemployment data should be modified to take account of this
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and satisfactions of jobs, and the skills and performance qualities of
workers, are varied, complex, and difficult to price objectively, we
think that the most suitable reference price is that provided by the
operation of the market itself, namely, the wages that were actually
paid for the particular kind of job by that employer or actually
received by a particular worker in the recent past. Hopefully, such
references provide a sufficiently firm base in the experience of
workers and employers that measurements of vacancies and unem-
ployment, based on the following definitions, will have reasonable
stability.
A person who is not working is considered unemployed if (I) he
is actively engaged in the search for a job, or (2) he is able to work
and would accept the opportunity, should it be offered, to work at
his previous job and wage.2
Inclusion of the latter category is designed to prevent the concept
of unemployment from relating only to job search behavior, rather
than to all instances of inability to find work at reasonable wages.
In the latter category the provision also must be made that the man
still qualifies for holding the old job, if it were offered. We do not
want to include among the unemployed the older worker who no
longer is qualified for any job and has stopped looking for work.
Although a hypothetical question will have to be asked to deter-
mine who is unemployed, the question relates to concrete past expe-
riences of the worker, and hence should be amenable to valid an-
swers. In any case, the data from the two categories of overt and
concealed unemployment should be kept separate.3
Job vacancies are defined as (1) the number of unfilled job open-
ings whose labor requirements and wage rates are formally specified
in firms that are actively recruiting, and (2) the number of men
who would be hired today (but not necessarily to start work im-
mediately) if they had the same skills and wage requirements as the
men that the company has recently hired to fill corresponding posi-
2Theconcept might be modified to include only the bestofhis recent jobs,
to avoid giving undue weight to a job which the worker quit because it proved
unsatisfactory. Basically, we want to know if a person would accept a "reason-
able" job, but has been discouraged from looking actively.
The inclusion of data on still another category has considerable interest—
employed workers searching for a better job.Concept of Vacancies in Labor Market Theory 77
tions. The second category must be measured by answers to a hypo-
thetical question; however, the question would refer to previous
concrete experiences of the employer. Such experiences define both
wages and skills which in the past have been acceptable to the em-
ployer. Efforts should be made to measure vacancies (including
those involved in the recall of former employees) at all of the hiring
points in the organization, in order for the sample to be representa-
tive; but double counting4 should be avoided by appropriate queries
concerning responsibility for hiring decisions.
The following questions are illustrative of the concepts involved.
(1) How many positions are you actively seeking to fill by recalling
former employees? (2) How many additional positions are you
actively seeking to fill by hiring new workers? (3) In addition to the
above, are there other positions for which you are not actively re-
cruiting, but which would be made available if suitable applicants
presented themselves? If so, how many? (By "suitable" we mean to
indicate the wage rates and skills that you have been willing to
accept in the recent past.)5
A worker who has not previously been employed, or a company
that has never previously hired persons in a particular skill cate-
gory will require other points of reference. The worker's general
perceptions of jobs and wages offered to workers of comparable
abilities and the employer's general perceptions of the skills and
wages of employees who are currently being hired by other em-
ployers would need to be used to delineate unemployment and
vacancies.
The concept of vacancies proposed isa stock, and the theory
developed below requires measurement of a stock. Useful informa-
tion pertaining to hires and labor market shortages could be ob-
tained from business firms by asking about their plans to hire over
some period of time, i.e., the planned flow of new workers. How-
ever, such a measure must be clearly distinguished from the stock
of job vacancies.
It might even be necessary to deteriuine vacancies at several points in a
firm, aggregate them, and resubmit to a higher levelin management who,
being aware of budget constraints, might make downward adjustments.
More thought needs to be given to these questions before they are ready
for inclusion in a questionnaire.78 Measuring the Current Demand for Labor
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN FLOWS AND STOCKS
INTHE LABOR MARKET
Theflows and stocks that are to be studied are shown in Figure 1.
The lower case letters represent flows (i.e., Units per period of time)
and the upper case letters, stocks (i.e., units at the end of the time
period). Sales of goods (s) flow from the stock of finished inventory
(H),andthe production flow replenishesthis inventory. Produc-
tion requires a flow of man-hours (m) from the employed work force
(E). This stock is regulated by retirements (r) and quits (q), both of
which reflect worker decisions; by layoffs plus terminations (1) and
recalls (c), which reflect decisions made primarily by the manage-
ments of firms; and by new hires (h), which occur when new em-
ployment agreements are made between unemployed workers and
firms. The stock of vacancies (V), i.e., the unfilled jobs that firms are
seeking to fill, is regulated by the difference between new hires (h)
plus recalls (c) and the net flow of new vacancies (v) that are created
by firms. The stock of unemployed workers (U) in the labor market
is regulated by the flow of quits (q), layoffs plus terminations (1),
recalls (c), and hires (h), and also the difference between entries (e)
into the unemployed work force from households and the corre-
sponding withdrawals (w). Finally, the number of family members
(F) not in the work force is regulated by births (b) and deaths (d),
as well as retirements (r), entrants (e), and withdrawals (w) from
the work force. These variables may be given time subscripts for
dynamic analysis and may be treatedas vectors where disag-
gregation is desired by family, firm, occupation, industry, or re-
gion.
The definitions of variables in Figure 1 lead to a set of account-
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Labor Market Flows and Stocks
V
Fnumber of family members not in work force; b =births;d =deaths;
e =entriesto work force; w =withdrawalsfrom work force; U =numberof
unemployed workers; V =numberof job vacancies; v =netnew job vacancies;
h =newhires;I =layoffsplus terminations and other separations; q =quits;
r =retirements;Fnumber of employed workers; E* =desirednumber of
employees; in =man-hours;p =productionof finished goods; H =finished
goods inventory; s =salesof finished goods.
d
Household members not
in the labor force
Business firms
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All variables are positive except v (net new vacancies), which can
go negative.
In the interests of formal simplicity, we assume that only unem-
ployed workers are hired. Thus, a worker going directly from one
job to another one will be considered to be momentarily unem-
ployed. Similarly, a vacancy that will immediately be filled by recall-
ing a laid off worker will be considered to have been momentarily
available in the labor market. This simplification can be readily
dropped if greater richness of classification is needed—for example,
to take explicit account of the employed-but-searching group.
This framework of labor market accounting in itself contains no
explicit behavioral hypotheses, but does serve to focus attention on
the flows in the labor markets which, in the United States, tend to
be very high relative to the stocks.
Separations of employees from firms for all reasons typically aver-
age 2 or 3 per cent a month. In order to maintain a constant work
force, a firm must replace in a year between 24 and 36 per cent of
its workers. Many employees, particularly young ones, leave new
jobs after short stays, possibly finding the positions less desirable
than anticipated or hoped. Firms may have to hire several workers
in order to keep one semipermanently. Older workers with seniority
are, of course, relatively less mobile. The tremendous turnover in
the labor force of a firm means that failure to hire new workers can
quickly lead to a catastrophic contraction of production. Thus, suc-
cessful recruiting in the labor market is important to the firm, just
as finding a job is important to the worker.
We present certain hypotheses about the behavior of the partic-
ipants in the labor market that are amenable to theoretical develop-
ment and to empirical estimation and testing. In general, we as-
sume that the participants act in line with their own economic
interest within the limits of their knowledge about their economic
environment.
Some of the behavioral relations, particularly labor force partic-
ipation decisions, have already been studied {12, 26, 40, 43]. In-
deed, one of the virtues of this approach is that it creates a fruitful
framework for both stimulating and utilizingthe research of
others.Concept of Vacancies in Labor Market Theory 81
Probability Behavioral Models
While such a variable as the flow of workers who quit their jobs is
a useful aggregate concept, the behavior of a particular individual
is dichotomous—he either quits or does not. Although the behavior
of individuals is influenced by a myriad of factors that may be
highly local and specific, for an analysis of the labor market we
should concentrate on the factors that have an important influence
on the probability of quitting by people generally, and hence are of
economic importance. Probability theory can then be used to infer
for large samples of workers the flow of those who quit. The same
argument applies for other variables. Behavioral theory, formulated
and even estimated in probability terms on the micro-level, can also
be applied on aggregate levels. Such probability models are espe-
cially appropriate in studying the search process of workers seeking
jobs, which inherently involves a large element of chance; that is, a
factor of dominant importance for an individual may be of negligible
importance for the economy as a whole, and hence is treated as a
random variable.
INDUCED LABOR DEMAND
Presumably, the demand for end products associated with consump-
tion, capital investment, and government expenditures, etc., induces
the demand for labor, but the response is rather involved. A de-
mand change at the firm level splits into a price response and a
production response, depending on capital utilization, inventory
position, degree of price competition, and tightness of the labor
market. The production response generates a secondary demand
response, depending on the product mix of the original end-product
demand, the input-output relations between industries, and the
occupation mix of the various industries. Depending on the exist-
ing capital capacity, work force, and outstanding job vacancies of a
firm, its production change leads to overtime and the generation of
new job vacancies, as well as demand for investment goods (or,
alternatively, idle time, worker layoffs, and the cancellation of job
vacancies).82 Measuring the Current Demand for Labor
Note that on the downswing the firm directly controls its employ-
ment through layoffs; on the upswing, it directly recalls workers
previously laid off. However, its search for suitable new employees
may not be successful and is not directly controlled.
Desired Work Force
Considerable normative and empirical work has been done on
the costs to firms of hiring and training, layoffs, overtime, idle time,
inventory holding, and lost sales due to inventory shortages. On the
basis of this work, a useful concept of desired work force (E*) is
formulated, i.e., the level of the work force which would be most
profitable [26]. The size of the desired work force depends on the
existing work force, the forecast of future sales, the present level of
finished inventory, the backlog of unfilled orders, labor produc-
tivity, and wage rates. A work force either above or below. E* is less
profitable, and the firm can be expected to take corrective actions to
change the size of its work force. A particular flow of labor man-
hours (m) can be obtained from work forces of various sizes by
varying overtime and short-time. However, both physical limits to
available time and costs of hiring, separation. and overtime deter-
mine a relation between fluctuations in production andfluctua-
tions in desired work force E*.
Vacancies
For a single homogeneous type of worker in a single plant, vacan-
cies and temporary layoffs will not occur at the same time. However,
when we aggregate over nonhomogeneous labor types, vacancies,
recalls, and layoffs can all occur simultaneously in the same plant.
In the following discussion the principles can be shown most
clearly by considering the determination of vacancies, recalls, and
layoffs for one particular type of labor at a single plant, without the
complexities of aggregation.
Firms recognize that a certain amount of time will be required to
recruit, hire, and train new workers, or to recall old ones, i.e., there
is a lead time in hiring workers. Consequently, new vacancies need
to be created in anticipation of future needs, both to compensate
for expected losses of the work force through quits, retirements, andConcept of Vacancies in Labor Market Theory 83
terminations during the lead time, and to build up the work force
for higher production levels that may be desired in the future. Thus
we would expect that the net flow of new vacancies (v) through the
creation or cancellation of vacancies (as contrasted to the filling of
vacancies) would be initiated by firms in order to maintain the stock
of vacancies (V) at the level determined by the following relation:
A A A 4
Vtmax [(Et* —+(qt+Tt ++(Et*) 0]. (6)
The first component is the present gap between desired and actual
work force. The second term provides for the anticipated quits, re-
tirements, and terminations that will take place during the average
lead timefor hiring and training new workers and/or recalling
old ones (anticipated flows are designated by the caret [A]). The last
term nrovides for the growth or contraction of the desired work
1 4
forceduring the lead time, where E* is the forecast change per
period in the desired work force. Note that the last two vacancy
components are associated with normal replacement and growth.
Only the first component reflects a current labor shortage or surplus
for the firm.
To understand (6)it may be helpful to look at the work force
that will be desired in the future at time (t +on the left of the
equation below, and add enough vacancies on the right to hit that
target:
A A A A Et*+Et* (7)
In this case we assume that the firm is actively recruiting. Hence
layoffs are those terminations involving individual workers whose
performance is unacceptable rather than those for the intentional
reduction of the work force. When a worker is hired,declines by
one andincreases by one, thereby maintaining the equality with
the expression on the left.
Recalls
If the work force of a firm needs to be increased and workers that
previously have been laid off are still available, new vacancies often
can be filled quickly by recalling former employees. This has the
effect of reducing the average lead timeto recruit an effective84 Measuring the Current Demand for Labor
worker for the job. We should note the distinction between recalls
ordered, i.e., recall vacancies, and actual recalls. Some recall vacan-
cies cannot be filled because the workers have taken other employ-
ment.
The search for new workers clearly is more involved than the re-
call of a well-known former worker. In a more refined analysis,
account should be taken of this distinction as well as the gradual
attenuation of the stock of laid-off workers that takes place with the
passage of time. Also, the expectation of recall affects the search
activity of the worker who has been laid off.
Layoffs
When a smaller work force is desired, the level of vacancies is
lowered and the work force is reduced through quits, retirements,
and terminations. However, when vacancies have been reduced to
zero, so that no new hires or recalls are ordered, further reductions
in the labor force will necessitate layoffs. The layoffs during a
period should be given by the following relation:
=max —— — 01, (8)
where is the work force desired by the firm at the end of the
period.
Wage Offers
If new hires are not successfully made to fill the job vacancies
during the expected lead time, the company will have a smaller
work force than desired. It would then face the following costly
alternatives: working overtime, losing sales, or reducing inventories
to a level lower than desired. Hence the company has an incentive
to reduce the vacancies, even at the penalty of raising its unit labor
costs. This cost increase may take the following forms: raising the
money wage rate of the job, reclassifying the job into a category
that carries a higher wage rate, and/or lowering the productivity
standards that the worker must satisfy by accepting less skill, expe-
rience, etc.
The more unfilled vacancies there are, or the longer the lead
time required for hiring, the greater the likelihood that the firmConcept of Vacancies in Labor Market Theory 85
will have a work force smaller than desired (see equation 6) and will
raise its unit labor costs in an effort to increase the effectiveness of
its recruiting efforts (see Figure 2). As these more attractive offers
are made, the labor deficiency tends to decline because of more
effective recruiting and possibly because of reductions in the size of
a desired work force that has now become more costly. Since pro-
ductivity standards determine the number of prospective employees
FIGURE 2
Response of Wage Offers to Excessive Vacancies
Reflecting a Deficiency in
the Size of the Work Force
Percentagerate of change of
money wage offered / labor productivity required
Work force
deficiency (f*.E)
thatwould be considered acceptable, while the wage level affects
the probability of workers accepting, the success in filling vacancies
should be directly affected by these changes in recruiting behavior.
The opposite arguments apply if vacancies are quickly filled and
the work force is larger than desired; the firm will tend to lower its
money wages and raise its productivity standards for new employ-
ees. The firm is likely, if it is permitted to do so by the union, to
lay off its less productive workers during periods of low production.
If replacements are needed, they can be obtained from the poo1 of
the unemployed.86 Measuring the Current Demand for Labor
Unstable queuing occurs when firms speculate on availability
by placing orders for materials in anticipation of shortages, i.e.,
longer lead times may also develop in the labor market. Firms
anticipating that the time to find and hire suitable employees will
increase, will tend to increase the number of vacancies (see equation
6). If other firms do likewise, the general increase in the number of
vacancies will increase the average lead time for hiring a worker.
(This point is clearer in equation 15.)
A high quit rate necessitates hiring and training replacements at
considerable cost to the firm. Hence, firms have an inducement to
raise wage rates of their current employees and advance them inter-
nally to better jobs when quit rates are high. However, firms will
tend to take advantage of the fact that their present workers are
committed in a variety of ways to the company, and hence will not
fully meet the current wage offers being made to prospective new
employees unless a union intervenes.
We recognize that unionization may influence the relationships
suggested, but we have not developed a theory of its effect. Since
unionized workers are a minority of the American work force, and
unions with substantial market power affect an even smaller group
of workers [71], it may not be unreasonable to view the above as
a first approximation.
THE LABOR SUPPLY
The exact motivation of the worker in offering his labor in the
market has been less carefully explored and is less easily derived
from simple assumptions than are the cost-profit motivations that
influence firm behavior. We assume that basically the worker con-
trols whether and on what terms he seeks work in the market and
whether he quits his current job. The theory could be elaborated
to permit limited choice of hours of work on his job, slowdown,
absenteeism, etc.
Labor Market Entry, Exit, and Retirements
Motivations to work are strongly influenced by the worker's
family role as income earner and/or as the supplier of services.Concept of Vacancies in Labor Market Theory 87
Other strong influences are the number of children or other depend-
ents and the living standards that are deemed acceptable by the
family.
The principal change in the size of the labor force during cycli-
cal fluctuations in the short run stems from the participation deci-
sions of secondary workers—mainly the young, the aged, and wives.
Primary workers, on the other hand, are nearly always in the labor
force; their important change in status is from employed to un-
employed.
In addition to the choice between work for money and leisure,
secondary workers have open to them such options as formal educa-
tion, housework, and child care. This permits them a flexibility
which results in a relatively elastic supply of labor. We could expect
on a priori grounds, and indeed we have empirical evidence, that
secondary workers would be highly responsive to changes in wage
rates in deciding whether to enter or not to enter the labor force.
At the same time, the influence of the income effect on work choices
makes it important to know about the employment and earnings of
the chief breadwinners in the families of secondary workers [12,
32, 40, 43].
An important link exists between the employment status of pri-
mary workers and movements in and out of the labor force by
secondary workers. When the head of the household becomes un-
employed, other family members seek work as a means of maintain-
ing the family income. The length of time spent by the unemployed
worker in search for a job and his acceptance wage will be related
to the earnings of other family members. The presence of family
members who are dependent and unable to work would be a sharp
spur to maintain or regain employment even on onerous terms.
It is clear that slumps in business activity set in motion two oppos-
ing forces with respect to labor force participation choices of
secondary workers. Declines in family incomes because of the un-
employment of primary workers stimulate participation;lower
wages and decreased vacancies discourage participation. Prelimi-
nary results of research with aggregative data indicate that the
effect of unemployment in the market is on net to diminish the
participation in the labor force of secondary workers. This consti-88 Measuring the Current Demand for Labor
tutes a hidden cost of unemployment of considerable magnitude
[13], and is one reason for broadening the concept of unemploy-
ment suggested earlier.
To examine the labor supply decisions that are made within the
family unit, detailed data are almost indispensable. In addition to
the obvious requirements for information on the standard demo-
graphic variables and data on the work status and work histories
of the family members, we need to know how these relate to the
income and asset position of the family, the composition of assets,
including home ownership, the geographic residence of the fam-
ily, etc.
The unemployed worker's decision to withdraw from the work
force rather than continue his job search is influenced by the dura-
tion of unemployment, eligibility for unemployment compensation,
liquid assets, contractual commitments, and local labor market
vacancies [43]. The last are particularly important for older workers
whose investment in housing precludes moving to other areas.
Temporary retirements are influenced by childbirth, illness in
the family, return to school, seasonal factors, etc. Permanent re-
tirements depend on age, health, pension rights, wealth [19, 32], etc.
Quits
Workers voluntarily quit for a wide variety of personal and tran-
sitory reasons, but also for economic reasons. When the number of
vacancies is high, a worker will have a relatively good opportunity
to find asignificantlybetter job from the many available. Every
vacant job that is more attractive than his present one constitutes
an opportunity for advancement, if he can qualify; and the stand-
ards for qualifying will tend to lower as the result of a prolonged
high stock of vacancies. Clearly if the wages offered in the market
are higher than those being paid in present employment, workers
who think that they can qualify for the new jobs will be inclined to
quit their present jobs.
The chance of succeeding quickly in the search for a better job
without a long period of lost earnings is better when vacancies are
high, i.e., the average duration of unemployment will fall with in-
creases in the number of vacancies available. If jobs are sufficientlyConcept of Vacancies in Labor Market Theory 89
plentiful, a worker may find a new job while still working at the
old job.
In a tight labor market, the chance that a man can find an offer
of a better job is enhanced both by the rising wage levels and by
the downgrading of skills required for a given position. Workers
are attracted both by the opportunity to move up the industrial
skill ladder and by a pay boost.
Labor Supply and the Acceptance Wage
A direct application of classical analysis would show the supply







catethat at a low wage rate the worker would only take part-time
work of perhaps 10 hours per week. At a higher wage rate he would
take a full time job, but through absenteeism would work only a
35-hour week on the average. At wage P0, 'the worker would work a
full 40-hour week. At sufficiently high wages he would "moonlight."
While such a supply curve may suffice in describing secondary
workers, it is hardly satisfactory as a description of the behavior of
the family's breadwinner who is likely to be offered a full-time job
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We cannot really think that a worker
would accept permanent unemployment if the highest offering wage
to be found is below a rigid acceptance level P0. Nor do we observe90 Measuring the Current Demand for Labor
cases of such deliberate choices to remain unemployed while the
unemployment compensation runs out and the family starves. To
be sure, rare cases may fit this model, but it is hardly adequate to
describe the general behavior of labor markets.
A better hypothesis would be that the unemployed worker's supply
curve continually drifts downward as he becomes more and more
discouraged, and as the family's financial and emotional resources
are consumed by continued failure to find an acceptable job. As
the job search continues without success, the weight of experience
accumulates to convince the worker that high aspirations are not
likely to be fulfilled in the present situation. Thus, the accumula-
tion of information tends to lower aspirations toward levels that are
more compatible with the jobs currently being offered.6 The lower
limit on the acceptance wage undoubtedly will reflect the unemploy-
ment compensation that is available.
The downward drift of the supply curve seems a much more
important phenomenon in describing the unemployed worker than
the graduation of working time vs. wage rate emphasized by the
supply schedule itself, although both may be useful. Thus a rele-
vant analysis is to use the acceptance wage P0 for a full-time job, and
emphasize its dependency on duration of unemployment (see Fig-
ure 4). If the worker is offered a wage greater than P0 he accepts it;
but with continued unemployment the acceptance wage gradually
falls. There is some empirical support for this hypothesis [61].
This behavior of an acceptance wage is closely related to the
aspiration level mechanism which has been subjected to consider-
6Theformal theory of search is in a very primitive state in general. One of
the pioneering articles appeared in 1953. See [31] for subsequent work.
Two interesting models are in the economic literature. H. A. Simon [60], in
analyzing the sale of a house, assumed that only one offer was received at a
time and that sequential decisions had to be made to accept or reject each offer
individually. George Stigler [62], in analyzing the labor market, assumed that
offers could be accumulated by extending the search, but at a cost; ultimately
the best offer was accepted. Market search gradually runs into diminishing
returns.
Both of the models are purely normative. Much more work needs to be done
to develop a model that adequately reflects the sequential nature of the decision
problem, the increase in information that conies with search, the financial cost
of search, and the influence of changes in aspirations. Also stochastic learning
theory would seem to have some relevance for understanding the behavior of
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FIGURE 4
Acceptance Wage for a Full-Time Job
Acceptance
wage
ablestudy. Social psychologists find it a basic phenomenon often
observed in human decision making. The worker presumably starts
his job search where he thinks his chances of finding an acceptable
job are best, and gradually explores the less and less promising
opportunities. However, if his initial acceptance wage is high rela-
tive to the opportunities in the market, a considerable period of
unemployment may elapse as his acceptance wage declines and the
probability increases of his finding an acceptable offer. Employers
may interpret extended unemployment as evidence that the worker
lacks merit and this may reduce the probability of employment.
If so, this may contribute to "hard core" unemployment. These
tendencies may cancel so that the probability of finding a job per
period of time is nearly constant or at least changes slowly.
Effect of Quits and Layoffs on the Acceptance Wage
The initial acceptance wage P0 for the worker who has been laid
off or terminated would probably be approximately the wage that
he had been receiving and presumably would have been satisfied to
continue accepting. The acceptance wage for the laid-off worker
may be virtually constant as long as he has hopes of recall, but will
fall later. However, for the worker who quit his old job to seek a
better one, the initial acceptance wage would probably be higher
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than his previous wage. Thus the worker who quits tends to have
a higher aspiration level than the worker who is laid off.
General Determinants of Family Decisions
lEn the case of the business firm we found that a fairly complex
dynamic analysis of costs and benefits throws considerable light on
the concept of desired work force, which in turn is the basis for
determining job vacancies. The foregoing consideration of the
family suggests that a dynamic analysis of costs and benefits may
help to clarify the concept of desired employment. Clearly the
family's desire for work depends on such dynamic phenomena as
habit persistence in consumption, contractual saving, and psycho-
logical costs and benefits of the process of work itself.
The assumptions of rational behavior probably will need to be
extended considerably in the case of the family to take account of
the limitations of its decision-making time and talents, and the
costs of obtaining relevant information. The employment desired
by a family member depends on many factors as outlined above. The
search process may prove so costly and unproductive that itis
dropped, and with good reason, but the person may still be unem-
ployed in a significant social and economic sense.
THE MARKET FOR WORKERS AND JOBS
The two-sided search process of workers for jobs and firms for
workers yields a flow of new hires plus recalls (h +c),which would
tend to reduce both U and V except for offsetting inflows. The wage
agreements that are made in this process collectively constitute the
level of market wages.
The flows in the labor market are important even when the stocks
are unaffected. For example, an employed person may search the
job market, quit his current employment, and move almost imme-
diately into a job vacancy. This turnover transaction leaves the
stocks virtually unchanged. Because he is unemployed for a very
short time, unemployment is little affected and the early appear-
ance of a replacement vacancy leaves vacancies little affected except
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money wages of the worker, and often this is the prime motivation
for such a move.
The likelihood of filling vacancies depends on the number of
unemployed workers with the necessary qualifications, on the effec-
tiveness of their search in finding the available vacancies, and on
their willingness to accept the jobs at the wages offered. For the
worker, considerable time may be consumed in locating vacancies
that come close enough to his requirements to merit investigation.
Even then, a job may be accepted only to be quit a week later and
the search continued. On the company side, the economic produc-
tivity of a potential worker is difficult to predict and often requires
time-consuming interviews, etc. Thus considerable delay is involved
for both worker and job vacancy while the search for a. satisfactory
match between job and worker takes place.
Since the worker offers maximum skills and specifies minimum
wage, and the vacancy specifies minimum skills and maximum wage,
there is a conflict of interest in striking the individual wage bargain.
In Figure 5, the shaded areas indicate points that are acceptable
to firm and worker, respectively. The lack of overlap of the shaded
areas indicates that an inquiry by this worker about this job is un-
likely to result in a hiring agreement at this time. His acceptance
wage is too high and the skill requirements are too high.
FIGURE 5
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It is clear that finding an acceptable job is a rather difficult and
time-consuming search process. The complex random process of job
seeking and finding arises from the nonstandardization of jobs and
workers and the lack of perfect knowledge. This accounts for the
simultaneous existence of unemployed workers and job vacancies,
a situation not contemplated in classical economic theory, in which
there may be excess supply or excess demand but not both.
The typical worker enters the labor market with an initial
acceptance wage which is higher than the wage he is likely to be
offered immediately.7 Offers below his acceptance wage will be
rejected as he will prefer to search further rather than accept. As
his search continues and his acceptance wage falls, he will ultimately
encounter an acceptable offer, but the time required involves a
large element of chance. On the other side of the market, firms try
initially to hire very productive workers at low wage rates. If the
firm fails in this,it gradually extends offers toless productive
workers or offers higher wage rates. These changes in worker and
vacancy which take place with the passage of time are indicated
by the arrows in Figure 5.
Stochastic Equilibrium in the Labor Market
The dynamic solution of such a complex stochastic process usu-
ally is unobtainable by present analytic methods, although simula-
tion methods by electronic computer can often be used to obtain
practical results. In the absence of either of the above methods, a
rough outline of the equilibrium solution can be surmised. Since
the average duration of unemployment is of the order of a few
months, this process is probably close to stochastic equilibrium over
the course of the business cycle, so that results derived from the
assumption of stochastic equilibrium will suffice as a first approxi-
mation. The unemployed workers and job vacancies flow into the
market and accumulate until the acceptance levels drift down far
enough to meet the offering levels which are drifting up. As these
levels meet in random pairings of jobs and workers, hiring trans-
actions increase until an equilibrium is reached such that the out-
Thehouse seller who sets a high price and gradually lowers it as he gets
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flow from the market equals the inflow, and the stocks of unem-
ployed workers and jobvacanciesarestabilizedatconstant
levels.
Viewing the labor market as a whole, it is clear that the level of
unemployment, i.e., stock of unemployed workers, is determined by
the inflows and the outflows. When unemployment is at a constant
equilibrium level, the total inflow will equal the total outflow. The
same applies to vacancies. Also note that the hiring or recalling of
an unemployed worker reduces by one the stocks of both unem-
ployed workers and vacancies. Hence, in equilibrium, this outflow
of vacancies through hiring and recalls equals the inflow of vacan-
cies, and also equals the net inflow of unemployed, i.e.,
(9)
Indeed, these equalities are nearly maintained even when the
market is not in equilibrium because the flows are so large relative
to the change in stocks. For example, an increase of unemployment
of 5 per cent in a year would be a large change in this stock, but
this compares to a flow through the American labor market during
the year of between 24 and 36 per cent of the employed work force,
as noted earlier. Thus we see that relatively small deviations in
these large flows from the equality relationships can produce the
changes in the stocks that are observed. However, the composition
of the flows through the labor market may change drastically over
the cycle; for example, the relative magnitude of quits and layoffs,
both of which are flows of workers from jobs into the unemployed
category, are subject to large changes. When layoffs are high, volun-
tary quits are low, and vice versa.
Hiring Flows and the Durations of Unemployment and Vacancies
Because the hiring process involves much random search, itis
best analyzed in probability terms. The flow of new hires depends
on the number of unemployed workers and the probability per
unit of time of their finding an acceptable job. In equilibrium
this probability will depend on the number of job vacancies avail-
able to find and choose from. In its simplest form we would expect
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worker would find an acceptable job vacancy is in direct proportion
to the total number of vacancies available, i.e.,
where k is a constant.
(10)
Thus, if the vacancylevel changes slowlyand other factors that
might affect this probability are of secondary importance, we would
expect to observe an exponential distribution for duration of unem-
ployment. Furthermore, this distributionshould change system-
atically over the business cycle with changes in the level of vacancies
(see Figure 6). These hypotheses seem to receive considerable sup-
port from the work of Woytinski[72]and Berman [3], although
It follows further that the flow of new hires plus recalls in a
period is the product of the number of unemployed and the prob.
ability that each will find a new job in the time period or be recalled
to an old one
or using equation 10,
h+c= UP?L; (11)
h+c=k UV (12)
there is some tendency for the probability of employment to fall
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By analogous reasoning we would expect that the probability per
period of timethat a vacancy would be filled with an acceptable
worker would be proportional to the number of unemployed work-
ers available from which to choose.
(13)
Again we would expect an exponential distribution of the duration
of a vacancy, and this distribution would be expected to change
systematically over the business cycle. Perhaps hard-to-fill vacancies
would show some decline in the probability of being filled as dura-
tions increase.
Figure 7 shows a plot of John Myers' data on duration of va-
cancies in Rochester, New York (see Table 4 of his article in this
volume). The anticipated straight line on a semilog plot seems
reasonably supported.
The flow of new hires plus recalls should be the product of the
number of vacancies (V) and the probability (P7,) of each being
filled per period. Thus, again we obtain equation 12 for the
hiring and recall flow. Although the stocks and flows in the labor
market are cyclically active, the total of new hires and recalls (total
accessions) does not fluctuate proportionately as much as unemploy-
ment and vacancies. Consequently, using equation 12, we would
expect to find U and V negatively correlated (a rise in unemploy-
ment being accompanied by a fall in vacancies, and vice versa) and
when plotted on log-log paper would fall close to a straight line
with a slope of —45°. The former point is in general consistent with
Charlotte Boschan's findings reported in this volume, and the latter
roughly consistent with the work of Knowles and Kalacheck (see
[69], Chart 15, p. 73).
Since, in equilibrium, the average duration of unemployment
will be the stock U divided by the flow (h +c),and similarly for the
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they are unemployed (equation 14), and the longer they are unem-
ployed the lower their acceptance wage (Figure 4). Since firms will
try to hire the most productive men available for the wage offered,
they will tend to pay the lowest wage acceptable to the workers.
Hence with a steady flow of workers through the market we may
expect a relation in equilibrium between the rate of change of
money wages and the level of unemployment.
If equilibrium occurs with low unemployment and high vacancies,
then every worker who passes through the market is likely to receive
an increase in money wages. As much of the working population
gradually passes through the labor market, and the wages of those
who don't are raised to prevent their quitting, the whole money
wage level will steadily rise. Firms and unions would both tend to
push up the wage rates of the workers who didn't quit in an effort
to keep up with the market rates for new workers.
If, on the other hand, the equilibrium occurred when unemploy-
ment was high and vacancies low, the workers would stay in the
market until wage rates lower than had been previously received
become acceptable, and wage rates would fall steadily.
We assume that fluctuations in the labor market arise prima-
rily from the demand side. An increase in sales leads sequen-
tially to increases in production, man-hour requirements, desired
work force, vacancies, and employment. Finally, unemployment de-
clines.
Now we may drop the assumption of equilibrium in the labor
market and examine what will happen if aggregate demand starts
to increase. This will lead to an increase in the desired work force;
E* is positive. From equation 6 we see that vacancies increase,
and with more vacancies available we would expect the quit rate to
rise. The layoff rate would decline, as is clear from equation 8.
The composition of the unemployed gradually shifts, so that there
are fewer unemployed workers laid off and more who voluntarily
quit. Since the latter have higher aspiration levels, money wages
rise even faster. Hence, the rate of increase of money wages at any
given level of unemployment is greater if unemployment is falling
than if it is constant. The opposite sequence of events occurs for
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UNION BARGAINING
The operation of the labor markets that has been described con-
stitutes the economic environment in which union-management
bargaining takes place, and the conditions in this market influence
strongly the relative bargaining power of the parties. For example,
when there are few unemployed workers available and the quit rate
is high, firms have an incentive to raise their wages in line with
competitors in the labor market, even without union pressure. Such
circumstances will tend to tip the bargaining in favor of the union;
conversely, high unemployment favors the management side. The
outcomes of the bargaining process in turn affect the labor markets.
Clearly, the institutional structures for decision-making in firms,
unions, and government, the bases of bargaining power and influ-
ence, and the bargaining strategies of the participants, introduce
problems of analysis that go far beyond this theory of the labor
market. Although relevant to the present analysis, extension of the
theory to encompass this complex area is not attempted here.
IMPLICA TIONS FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY
The foregoing theoretical framework raises more questions than it
answers, and invites tests, revisions, refinements, and applications
in many directions. Its value will depend upon its usefulness in
bringing empirical and theoretical problems into sharp focus. It
has been possible from logical extensions of the above theory to
derive mathematically the Phillips' relation between percentage of
unemployment and its rate of change, and the percentage rate of
change of wages [25]. These conclusions are in general agreement
with Phillips' empirical results [49], and hopefully are a first step
in explaining them. The following is a sketch of some areas where
the proposed theory may be applicable.
A Stochastic System as a Model of the Labor Market
If we could achieve a quantitative model of the labor market
from which reliable predictions could be drawn, we would take a
significant step forward, both in understanding a complex area andConcept of Vacancies in Labor Market Theory 10.1
in obtaining an important tool for policy use. The theory proposed
here suggests that (I) the market is a complex system involving
many important relationships, and (2) the heart of the process is
the random interaction between unemployed workers and job
vacancies. 1f this is true, we are challenged with the need to study
a large number of relationships, to fit them into a stochastic system
and learn how to manipulate it for validation and application.
It might appear that the theory as presented visualizes a single
labor market free of occupational and regional distinctions. In a
sense this is true because the possibility of marginal substitutions
means that some random diffusion of both workers and vacancies
occurs across all boundaries of conventional classifications. Never-
theless, it is clear that the probabilities of crossing certain barriers
may be low, and the model should be developed to reflect this. Much
more work is needed to identify the occupational groups and
regions within which movement iseasy, and to find the paths
between those occupational groups and regions which are most likely
to be used when more substantial adjustments are required. We
need to extend the theory of the worker's search for jobs to describe
the extent to which workers invest time and money in searching
markets successively more remote in occupation and location from
their previous employments.
All the major parts of this formal framework of the labor market
require estimation and testing. Furthermore, itis clear that we
must use simultaneous-equation estimating techniques, if we are
to obtain parameters that accurately reflect the underlying behavior
of families and firms. Lack of data especially suited to estimation
of the model may force the artful combination of existing time
series data with available cross-section materials to obtain a model
of the market that can be simulated.
A first step in the research might be to estimate a macroeconomic
model of the manufacturing labor market, using available data on
turnover, vacancy indexes, wage levels, and production. This should
be useful in showing the rough dynamics of wage movements in
response to sales and production.
Substantial development of both theory and empirical sources of
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choose to quit jobs and the process by which they locate new em-
ployment. Such work clearly needs to be carried out to test the
model of wage aspirations that we have sketched in the supply side
of the market.
Because of the limited mobility of workers in the short run, it may
prove extremely valuable to explore the response of a local labor
market using this model. In relatively small markets it might be
possible to estimate parameters determining the decisions for opti-
mum production scheduling and work force for individual firms,
and to study the reactions of individual families through survey
techniques.
Careful attention should clearly be given to making estimates of
the cost of job search to the individual, and the economic pressures
that determine the rate of decline of acceptance wages. Such work
has been begun by Cohen, Haber, and Mueller [14].
Clearly, the model needs to be elaborated to account adequately
for recall of workers and the ties that hold them to their former
employment. Turnover associated with no intervening unemploy-
ment must also be admitted. However, the dynamic formulation of
the behavior of firms and workers suggested above will continue to
be the core of these more elaborate theories. Vacancy data are criti-
cal to the whole effort, as they are vital to any estimate of how the
market operates stochasticallyto induce flows of newly hired
workers. Ideally we should have sets of detailed time series data on
a representative sample of firms and families. If panels were organ-
ized for this purpose now, we would gradually accumulate the kind
of data that is needed to advance our fundamental knowledge.
Costs and Benefits
The detailed study of the behavior of market participants leads
naturally into a consideration of the costs and benefits that are
involved. For example, estimates of the costs of unemployment and
vacancies, taking account of durations, will throw light on the policy
choices that need to be made. Similarly, the costs of job search,
mobility, recruiting, and training can be weighed against the costs
of vacancies, unemployment, and the benefits of increased produc-
tivity, when the stochastic relationships are better known.Concept of Vacancies in Labor Market Theory 103
Inflation and Unemployment
If there were no fear of inflating the price level, unemployment
could be wiped out simply by increasing aggregate demand. Hence,
the relation between wage rates and unemployment is of crucial
importance. Phillips' work indicated that a steady drift of the wage
rate was associated with a given level of unemployment and the
rate of change of unemployment. The fact that this drift rose
sharply at low levels of unemployment came as no surprise—the full
employment ceiling was being approached. But we had little insight
into the determinants of this relation whose existence has now re-
ceived empirical support from the data of several countries including
the United States.
The theory presented above suggests the mechanisms at work.
When vacancies are scarce and unemployment is high, an unem-
ployed worker has a relatively small chance of connecting success-
fully with a job, per week of job search. Consequently, on the aver-
age, the duration of unemployment is long and the unemployed
worker's aspiration level falls. The acceptance wage declines sub-
stantially from levels prevailing at the time of last employment.
The employers, facing a large number of job applicants, try to hire
the best men for the wages that are offered. If unemployment is
high enough, and the average duration of unemployment long
enough, the hiring wage may be lower than that the men were
receiving at the time that they became unemployed. The conse-
quence is a gradual downward drift of the money wage level as
workers gradually pass through the market.
Conversely, when vacancies are many and unemployment is
low, the unemployed have a high probability of being offered
acceptable jobs per period of time, and consequently experience a
short duration of unemployment on the average. Their wage accept-
ance levels are correspondingly high. If employers are going to
succeed in hiring workers, they will pay the high money wage or
accept lower productivity in positions with a given title. When the
contract wage is higher than the wages previously received by the
worker, the wage level drifts upward. The lower the level of unem-
ployment the faster wages rise.104 Measuring the Current Demand for Labor
Corresponding pressures to adjust wages arise through the chang-
ing relative importance of quits and layoffs at different stages of the
business cycle. Even if such pressures are ignored, we see that the
Phillips' relation depends critically on (I) the speed with which men
and jobs are matched in the labor market, and (2) the rate at which
the unemployed worker's acceptance wage falls with extended un-
employment. The former depends primarily on the speed of com-
munication, transportation, interviewing, information processing,
etc.; the rate of change of acceptance wages depends primarily on a
psychological aspiration level mechanism, but also on the informa-
tion on which the worker bases his expectations.
Furthermore, we can predict that a similar relation can be found
between the rate of change of wages and the number of job vacan-
cies divided by the size of the work force. This relation also will
depend on the speed of the search process; in addition, it will
depend on the rapidity with which employers respond to labor
shortages by raising effective wage rates. Employers' wage responses,
in turn, are the product of complex interactions among inventory
levels, capacity use, capital-labor substitution potentialities, and the
possibilities of expanding overtime hours.
Further study will be required to determine how much light this
model and its refinements throw on our policy choice between in-
flation and unemployment.
Structural Unemployment and Mobility
If we should find, as is likely, that the experience of unemploy-
ment not only depresses the acceptance wage, but also the search
activity, then presumably the probability of finding a job would
decrease for the long unemployed. This would tend to perpetuate
the duration of unemployment for the long unemployed. Other
influences that would inhibit search might play a role, such as the
declining financial and emotional resources to continue the search,
or the lack of resources to move to new locations and locate distant
opportunities.
If the unemployed worker's aspiration level in terms of wage and
occupation did not fall with the passage of time, there might be a
complete failure of the individual to make a needed adjustment.Concept of Vacancies in Labor Market Theory 105
Although this is not likely, certain groups may adjust slowly or
have very large adjustments to make, thereby "requiring" rela-
tively long unemployment to achieve the adjustments.
Similar adjustment problems could occur on the hiring side. If
employers did not raise the wage offers for job vacancies that were
long unfilled, not only would this inhibit production, but the lack
of sufficient incentive might prevent qualified workers from shifting
to these vacancies, thereby precluding the "upgrading" process that
would create more easily filled vacancies at the lower level.
Development of quantitative estimates of parameters are clearly
of major importance for creation of policies to deal with unemploy-
ment. Estimates of the value of k in equation 12 will give a
quantitative notion of the effectiveness of present information
channels in bringing together workers and vacancies in compatible
combinations. Some preliminary estimates by the authors suggest
that k depends on the duration of unemployment. This phenom-
enon requires some elaboration of the underlying theory, but it is
certainly suggestive of the important qualitative differences in skills
of short- and long-term unemployed that have already been observed.
The implications of such differences for job counselling and the
process of job search certainly ought to be developed by empirical
study. Simulation of the model with alternative values for the
parameter k will give policy-makers some idea of what changes in
the unemployment rate can be anticipated if the job search process
can be made more efficient.
Manpower Projections and Training
Many vacancies are associated with labor turnover, as workers
circulate from one employer to another and as retirements are
replaced with new employees. Others are associated with company
growth. Only the first component of vacancies in equation 6 reflects
a labor shortage. Consequently, vacancy data and plan-to-hire data
must be used very carefully in drawing inferences about the aggre-
gate manpower requirements for the country in various occupational
categories. Stated differently, we must be careful not to confuse
flows and stocks.
The theory suggests that data collected from companies on their106 Measuring the Current Demand for Labor
projections of desired work forces (which are stocks) classified by
occupation might be useful for training programs and other man-
power planning. If vacancy data are used, they must be carefully cor-
rected for quit rates, etc. For example, a company with just the
right number of tool makers will always have vacancies for tool
makers to replace those who quit to work for other companies.
Because ittakes time for the search process required tofilla
vacancy, a company will not wait to start its search until the worker
is needed. Instead, it will create a vacancy in anticipation of the
need.
There is a clear trade-off between the costs of retraining a man
for a job at hand and the cost of a man's search for a job that will
use the skills which he already has. Only when we better understand
the operation of the labor market will we be prepared to handle the
policy choices between subsidizing job-worker search, mobility, and
retraining in our efforts to find the best response to technological
change.
The authors do not want to claim too much for their efforts, but
it does seem clear that much interesting work lies ahead in trying to
answer the many questions raised. They propose to pursue research
based on this approach, hope that others will be attracted to do so,
and welcome all comments and criticisms.
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